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1.    Introduction 
At  the  outset  of  the  global  financial 
and  economic  crisis,  Africa’s 
immunity  from  negative  effects  was 
widely  predicted,  given  its  limited 
financial  integration  with  the  rest  of 
the world. While the crisis hit Africa 
with  delay,  it  operated  through 
multiple  channels  (trade,  capital 
flows,  remittances,  tourism,  and 
others)  and  led  to  a  significant 
slowdown of African economies. Real 
GDP growth fell from an average of 
5.6%  during  2001  –  08  to  2.5%  in 
2009,  while  working  poverty  and 
unemployment  escalated,  especially 
among the youth. 
 
Indeed,  Africa  has  weathered  the 
crisis  well  relative  to  most  other 
developing regions and relative to its 
own past record. Nevertheless, current 
global  recovery  has  become  even 
more  fragile.  Concerns  over  fiscal 
tightening  and  sovereign  credit  risks 
in Europe have been mounting, while 
the lukewarm performance of the US 
economy only heightened the fears of 
a  double-dip  or  substantially  slower 
recovery. In spite of the EU’s massive 
stabilization fund of €750 billion, the 
financial turmoil in Europe has still not 
subsided, with four euro zone countries 
– Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece – 
having  downgrades  of  sovereign  risk 
rating since the beginning of 2009.  
 
 Sparked by the Greek debt crisis, the 
European  sovereign  debt  turmoil  has 
increased  the  fragility  of  Africa’s 
recovery,  given  the  strong  economic 
links  between  the  two  continents.  For 
Africa,  this  turmoil  may  have  several 
implications  as  the  crisis  may  be 
transmit  to  the  continent  through 
various  channels.  The  extent  of 
transmission  will  however  depend  on 
the  degree  of  trade  and  financial 
linkages  with  Europe  and  on  the 
resilience  and  policy  space  of  the 
specific economies and sub-regions. 
On a more positive note, the July 2010 
Update of the IMF Financial Stability 
Report points out that the transmission 
of sovereign credit risk due to the very 
high public debt levels in Europe has so 
far  been  primarily  financial  in  nature 




Volume 1, Issue 2  
14 July, 2010 
 
 




Prepared by the following staff:  Gil Seong Kang, Abdul B. Kamara and Zuzana Brixiova. 
  
 
  Mthuli Ncube 
  m.ncube@afdb.org 
  +216 7110 2062 
 
  Charles Leyeka Lufumpa 
  c.lufumpa@afdb.org 
  +216 7110 2175 
 
  Leonce Ndikumana 
  l.ndikumana@afdb.org 
  +216 7110 2076 
 
1 On a less positive note, some analysts argue that the European debt crisis is likely to persist for a while as the 
turmoil is a confidence problem. The Greek crisis for instance primarily reflects fiscal indiscipline over several 
years,  which  was  disguised  by  misreporting.  The  exposure  of  this  misreport  led  to  loss  of  credibility  and 
confidence  in  the  ability  of  the  Greek  government  to  manage  its  finances,  and  thus  required  not  only  the 













































                                     
“North Africa is most 
dependent on trade 
with the European 
(EU), followed by West 
Africa, Southern 
Africa, Central Africa 
and East Africa.” 
In  that  context,  the  July  2010  IMF 
Update of the World Economic Outlook 
has cut the baseline forecast for the EU in 
2011 only marginally. It  actually raised 
slightly  its  forecast  of  growth  for  Sub-
Saharan  Africa,  driven  in  part  by  more 
buoyant growth in Asia (Annex). At the 
same  time,  the  revised  outlook 
underscores  that  the  risks  of  a  feeble 
global recovery have increased markedly 
(IMF, 2010b).  
 
Notwithstanding the overall still positive 
outlook, downside risks to global as well 
as Africa’s recovery have risen and need 
to  be  carefully  monitored.  This  brief 
examines  these  risks  from  the  broader 
perspective  of  Africa’s  economic 
recovery and long-term growth.   
 
2.  Trade Risks 
 
As  Mhango  (2010)  points  out,  while 
timely  and  effective,  it  is  unlikely  that 
rescue packages of the EU and the IMF 
will completely offset the impact of the 
debt  crisis  on  European  economies. 
Fiscal consolidation measures especially 
are likely to slow Europe’s growth. The 
most immediate and direct impacts of the 
European crisis for Africa would thus be 
through  trade.
2  Given  the  strong  trade 
linkages  with  European  markets,  the 
overall  negative  impacts  on  African 
exports  would  be  substantial.  The 
severity  of  the  impacts  at  regional  and 
country  levels  would  vary  with  the 
degree  of  dependency  on  European 
markets as well as offsetting linkages to 
other  developing  regions,  in  particular 
China,  India  and  the  Gulf  countries 
(Annex). 
 
2.1  Regional disparities 
 
North Africa is most dependent on trade 
with  the  European  (EU),  followed  by 
West Africa, Southern Africa, Central 
Africa  and  East  Africa  (Figure  1). 
About  60%  of  North  Africa’s  export 
earnings  come  from  the  EU,  with  a 
few  countries  such  as  Tunisia  and 
Libya  sending  over  75%  of  total 
exports to European counties. Thus, a 
slower-than-expected  European 
recovery  or  double  dip  would  have 
significant  negative  impact  on  these 
countries.  
 
The second set of countries with high 
trade  risk  exposure  to  Europe  is  the 
CFA Zone countries. The countries in 
this  largely  West  Africa  Common 
Monetary  Zone  have  a  significant 
linkage with European markets, which 
is  a  destination  to  over  36%  of  the 
Zone’s total export. While the risk of 
falling demand from Europe is a cause 
for concern to many, some are of the 
view  that  the  14-country  CFA  Zone 
may in fact gain from Europe’s debt 
crisis,  due  to  the  currency  peg  to  a 
weakening  euro.  This  may  actually 
make CFA Zone exports to the rest of 
the world more competitive, especially 
dollar-based  exports  –  crude  oil, 
cocoa, coffee and groundnuts. So far, 
the CFA franc has depreciated against 
the US dollar by about 17% since the 
end of 2009. The currency peg to the 
Euro  also  implies  that  most  of  the 
CFA  Zone  countries  have  their 
reserves  in  Euro,  which  could 
depreciate  in  real  terms,  in  terms  of 
months  of  import  cover.  In  fact,  the 
currency  peg  actually  requires  that 
more than 80% of the foreign reserves 
of  these  African  countries  are 
deposited in the “operations accounts” 
controlled  by  the  French  Treasury 
(Busch, G. K., 2008).  
“While the risk of 
falling demand from 
Europe is a cause for 
concern to many, some 
are of the view that the 
14-country CFA Zone 
may in fact gain from 
Europe’s debt crisis, 
due to the currency peg 
to a weakening euro.” 
2 The 2009 trade collapse accompanying the global financial and economic crisis hit Africa 
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“The tourism sector is 
also likely to be 
affected by the 
European crisis, 
particularly in Cape 
Verde and Mauritius, 
where tourism receipts 
account for more than 
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Figure 1: Africa's exports to the EU by regions 
(% of total exports in 2008) 
2.2  National and sector 
disparities 
 
As  depicted  in  Figure  2,  exports 
destined  for  the  EU  in  2008 
represented  over  50%  of  total  export 
earnings  in  15  countries
3.  These 
countries  also  have  substantial  trade 
risks  from  Europe  should  the  current 
turmoil  lead  to  a  significant  fall  in 
demand.  Most  of  the  remaining 
countries  have  limited  exposure  to 
trade  risk  from  Europe,  especially 
Zambia, Burkina Faso, Angola, Togo, 
Djibouti,  Benin,  Republic  of  Congo, 
Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan, Somalia, 
whose exports to the EU accounts for 
less than 20% of total export earnings. 
 
Besides  regional  and  country 
disparities, recession in Europe could 
have  substantial  implications  for  the 
sectoral  composition  of  African 
exports.  For  instances,  the  EU  is  the 
primary  market  of  the  Kenyan 
horticulture,  which  brought  nearly 
USD 1 billion in 2009, and is a major 
customer of South Africa’s automotive 
industry.  
 
These sectors would face declines in 
sales  if  cuts  in  expenditures  by 
European  governments  and 
households  are  realized.  Crude  oil 
exporting countries such as Equatorial 
Guinea,  Angola  and  Nigeria  may  be 
substantially  affected  by  a  drop  in 
demand  for  commodities  and  crude 
petroleum from Europe. 
 
In  contrast,  Ghana’s  primary  export, 
gold,  could  continue  to  benefit  from 
increasing  prices  as  risk  averse 
investors turn to gold as a substitute. 
The tourism sector is also likely to be 
affected  by  the  European  crisis, 
particularly  in  Cape  Verde  and 
Mauritius,  where  tourism  receipts 
account for more than 15% of GDP in 
2008. In Mauritius, European tourists 
accounted  for  about  67%  of  total 
tourist arrivals in 2009.  
 
 
3Tunisia, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Libya, Mauritius, Cameroon, Seychelles, Morocco, Cote 























   
 




























Figure 2: Africa's exports to the EU by countries 


































































3.1  Potential  reduction  in  tax 
revenue 
 
Declines in demand for African exports 
from Europe may adversely affect tax 
revenues, especially through trade and 
resource-related  tax  revenues,  which 
could make it difficult for countries to 
maintain  the  planned  levels  of  public 
expenditures  including  long-term 
infrastructure investment. In particular, 
countries with high fiscal deficits count 
among  the  most  vulnerable  to  these 
fiscal  risks.  Notable  among  these  are 
15 African countries, including Eritrea, 
Chad,  Ghana,  Algeria  and  Angola, 
whose fiscal deficits were recorded at 




3.  Sovereign Risks 
 
The second risk that African countries could 
face as a result of the European debt crisis is 
sovereign risk, which may arise from declines 
in tax revenue and ODA. There would also be 
a potential for increased costs of borrowing as 
a  result  of  changes  in  sovereign  risk 
premiums.  In particular, countries with high 
fiscal deficits have a relatively high exposure 
to the risk of re-pricing of sovereign risk.    
 
 
“Declines in demand 
for African exports 
from Europe may 




















Figure 3: Fiscal deficit of selected African countries 












































































The  decline  in  revenues  could  also  be 
significant,  especially  among  oil  and 
mineral  resource  exporters.  Resource-
related  tax  revenues  remain  the  most 
important  financial  source  for  several 
governments,  accounting  for  as  high  as 
66% of GDP in Libya and 39% in Angola 
in 2007. On the average, resource-related 
tax  revenues  as  a  share  of  GDP  nearly 
tripled  in  Africa  between  the  late  1990s 
and the start of the financial crisis before 
retreating back to around 15% of GDP. 
 
3.2  Potential contraction in ODA 
 
Should the European debt crisis continue 
to  deepen,  European  governments  would 
be  increasingly  forced  to  slash  spending, 
which  would  lead  to  declines  in  aid  to 
developing countries including Africa. For 
instances, Germany plans to trim Euro 81.6 
billion  in  federal spending  between  2011 
and  2014  and  Greece,  Spain,  Portugal, 
Ireland  and  Italy  have  all  announced 
austerity measures. 
 
These  measures  would  adversely  affect 
Africa,  given  the  continent’s  relatively 
high dependency on the EU for ODA. 
 
ODA inflows from the EU represent over 
80%  of  total  ODA  in  four  countries 
(Algeria, Mauritius, Tunisia and Morocco), 
over 50% in 23 African countries, and at 
least  20%  of  total  ODA  inflows  to  all 
African  countries  (Annex 1).  Declines  in 
aid already started to increase the financial 
burden  on  some  African  countries.  For 
instance,  Tanzania’s  2010/11  budget 
projects a decline in foreign aid and loans 
at 28% of the total budget compared with 
33%  in  2009/10.  Uganda  expects  budget 
support  grants  and  loans  to  drop  to  790 
billion  shillings  (USD  345  million)  in 
2010/11,  from  1.06  trillion  shillings  in 
2009/10. 
 
3.3  Increased costs of borrowing  
 
This type of risk impacts most directly 
the emerging market countries, such as 
South  Africa  and  Egypt.  These 
countries  have  also  experienced 
reduced  portfolio  flows  due  to  the 
reduced risk appetite of investors. 
 
Moreover,  most  frontier  markets  such 
as  Kenya,  Uganda,  Tanzania  and 
Nigeria, which postponed the launch of 
sovereign  bonds  amid  the  global 
financial crisis, decided to postpone it 
further.  Those  that  still  plan  to  issue 
bonds,  such  as  Ghana  could  face 
significantly higher costs. 
 
The shock from such turmoil in global 
bond markets would be concentrated in 
countries with weak fiscal balances and 
high indebtedness. This is so especially 
for external indebtedness which gives a 
measure  of  exposure  to  volatilities  of 
debt-service  costs,  which  could  also 
arise  from  changes  in  exchange  and 
interest  rates.  Among  the  most 
vulnerable countries  to these risks are 
Liberia,  Guinea-Bissau,  Zimbabwe, 
Seychelles and DR Congo, which have 
external  debts  of  over  100%  of  GDP 
(Annex 2).   
 
On the other hand, the European debt 
crisis  may  create  opportunities  in 
African  emerging-markets,  as  the 
situation  could  lead  investors  to 
undertake  portfolio  reallocation  from 
advanced country bonds into attractive 
emerging-market bonds. 
 
In this context, Bloomberg in June 2010 
reported that Ghana’s Eurobonds have 
surged 93% since last November, and 
may  continue  to  rise  given  the 
country’s  increasingly  attractive  fiscal 
position,  due  in  part  to  the  imminent 
production of oil. 
 
“On the average, 
resource-related tax 
revenues as a share of 
GDP nearly tripled in 
Africa between the late 
1990s and the start of 
the financial crisis 
before retreating back 
to around 15% of 
GDP.” 
 
“… the European debt 






































































4.  Liquidity Risk 
 
Central to European banking crisis is that 
Portugal,  Ireland,  Greece  and  Spain 
together owe hundreds of billions in Euros, 
mainly  to  banks  in  Europe.  According  to 
the  BIS  (Bank  for  International 
Settlements),  France  and  Switzerland  are 
most exposed to Greece’s debt, at Euro 65 
billion  each  -  about  twice  as  much  as 
Germany.  The  risk  remains  that  the 
contagion  of  the  European  banking  crisis 
could spread to African banking sector. 
 
4.1  Dominance of Foreign Banks 
 The impact of European debt and banking 
crisis, especially on African private sector 
could  be  worsened  by  the  tightening  of 
credit  markets  due  to  a  shortage  of  bank 
liquidity  as  well  as  a  rise  in  uncertainty. 
African  banks  would  therefore  have 
difficulties  securing  lines  of  credit  on 
international  markets.  The  impacts  will 
vary  with  the  degree  of  financial 
integration, such as foreign bank presence, 
which is a potential channel of contagion of 
financial distress.  
Foreign  bank  assets  represent  over 
70%  of  total  bank  assets  in  7 
countries (Annex  3),  and over  70% 
of banks in 11 African countries are 
foreign (Figure 4), including 4 CFA 
countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d'Ivoire and Niger). 
 
4.2  Other financial inflows 
 The impacts of European debt crisis 
could  also  be  transmitted  in  the 
continent  through  Foreign  Direct 
Investment (FDI). If European banks, 
which  are  the  major  players  in  the 
project-finance market face liquidity 
shortage  and  start  reducing  their 
exposure  to  emerging  countries, 
Africa will be affected. In addition, 
remittances,  which  have  become  an 
important  source  of  external 
financing  for  African  countries, 
would  be  affected.  A  recession  in 
Europe  will  therefore  lead  to  a 
slowdown in remittances as demand 
for unskilled labor declines.  
 
 



















Figure 4: Number of foreign banks as a % of tatal 
(1995 vs. 2006) 
1995
2006
“ The risk remains that 
the contagion of the 
European banking 




“A recession in Europe 
will therefore lead to a 
slowdown in 
remittances to Africa as 




































































5. Impacts on macroeconomic 
perspective 
 
While so far contained, the European debt 
crisis has a potential to negatively impact 
Africa’s  export  and  tourism  revenues, 
which would lead to deteriorating current 
account  balances  that  could  impair  the 
growth  prospects  of  the  continent. 
Contraction  in  demand  for  crude  oil  and 
other  commodities  could  reduce  jobs  in 
mining and other sectors, with severe social 
consequences.  
 
A  contraction  in  ODA  from  European 
countries  could  pose  tough  challenges  to 
African  governments  in  managing  public 
finance, especially in mobilizing resources 
for  expanding  infrastructure  investments 
and  strengthening  social  protection.  The 
situation could be worsened if tax revenues 
substantially decrease alongside declines in 
exports, exacerbated by potential tightening 
of  government  borrowings  from  foreign 
markets.  
In this worst case scenario, the continent’s 
medium-  to  long-term  growth prospects 
could  be  undermined  by  decreases  in 
investments,  which  could  weaken 
competitiveness  of  African  economies  in 
the long-term.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
While  Africa’s  growth  prospects  remain 
sound, risks of the continent’s exposure to 
the  European  crisis  need  to  closely 
monitored and well understood, especially 
with regards to export and tourism receipts 
and  financial  flows.  It  is  clear  that  such 
potential  impacts  would  vary  across  the 
continent, with North Africa being the most 




Even  though  fiscal  risks,  including 
declines tax revenues and contraction of 
ODA  from  the  EU  and  re-pricing  of 
sovereign borrowing risk, are identified 
and  discussed,  there  is  no  clear 
evidence  about  whether  they  would 
come to bear and if so to what extent. 
The exposure of Africa’s banking sector 
is  real,  due  to  the  heavy  presence  of 
foreign  banks,  which  needs  to  be 
closely watched from the perspective of 
liquidity  and  rising  uncertainty  from 
parent banks in Europe. 
 
The global financial crisis has already 
triggered  rethinking  of  development 
models  that  African  countries  have 
chosen  in  the  past,  with  a  renewed 
interest in domestic and regional drivers 
of  growth  (Brixiova,  Kamara,  and 
Ndikumana,  2010).  The  exposure  to 
risks from the European debt crisis and 
more recently also heightened risks of 
slower US recovery further underscore 
the  need  for  African  countries  to 
diversify into other regions such as the 
Middle  East  and  Asia  for  trade  and 
financial  services,  as  well  as  other 
financial  resource  flows.Measures  to 
restore  or  maintain  fiscal  soundness, 
which is the necessary precondition for 
macroeconomic  stability  at  a  time  of 
global  uncertainty,  need  to  be 
prioritized.  Going  forward,  the  global 
financial crisis and the recent European 
turmoil also highlight the importance of 
prudent management of capital flows as 
Africa  financial  markets  develop,  to 
prevent  boom-bust  cycles  experienced 
by  other  regions,  such  as  emerging 
Europe  during  this  global  crisis  and 
Latin America in the past.  
 
 
“A contraction in ODA 
from European 
countries could pose 
tough challenges to 




“While Africa’s growth 
prospects remain 
sound, risks of the 
continent’s exposure to 
the European crisis 
need to closely 
monitored and well 
understood, especially 
with regards to export 
and tourism receipts 
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Annex 4: Real GDP growth (proj.)
2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.0 5.9 4.7 5.9 0.3 0.0
World 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.3 0.4 0.0
Euro area 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.5 0.0 -0.2
EMEs/Dev. Countries 6.8 6.4 6.3 6.5 0.5 -0.1
Source: IMF WEO. 

























Annex 3: Percentage of bank assets owened by foreign banks 












Annex 5: Africa’s Exposure to the European Debt Crisis 
 
Country  Export (as % 
of GDP, 2009) 
ODA (as % of total 
revenues, 2008) 
Remittances to 
FDI (%, 2008) 
Exports to China, India 
and Middle East (as % 
of total export) 
Algeria  40.01  0.45  117.16  2.65 
Angola  58.35  0.86     32.72 
Benin  17.88  45.31  224.90  28.39 
Botswana  34.54  14.40  29.92  8.54 
Burkina Faso  9.95  70.98  36.47  18.01 
Burundi  11.96  151.62  2.20  5.90 
Cameroun  19.47  10.65  64.47  6.04 
Cape verde  13.74  42.14  66.42  0.00 
Central African Republic  9.51  85.48     10.40 
Chad  62.60  17.91     3.37 
Comoros  15.79  29.87  148.94  9.23 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  49.84  69.96  0.00  45.14 
Congo, Rep.  75.56  8.43  0.57  33.44 
Cote d'Ivoire  37.15  13.01  60.99  2.54 
Djibouti  35.93  29.39  12.17  10.35 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  25.04  3.31  99.80  21.05 
Equatorial Guinea  90.36  0.48     16.16 
Eritrea  3.34  43.28     40.92 
Ethiopia  11.47  77.47  386.87  17.71 
Gabon  58.98  1.18  54.27  18.69 
Gambia, The  47.17  55.62  102.33  43.05 
Ghana  42.02  28.27  6.04  7.47 
Guinea  27.67  43.54  11.17  7.63 
Guinea-Bissau  31.36  90.30  200.27  75.40 
Kenya  25.58  18.26  1750.07  7.39 
Lesotho  54.31  12.71  222.91  0.47 
Liberia  38.65  584.31  511.74  4.14 
Libya  63.93  0.10  0.39  5.67 
Madagascar  26.57  53.53  0.74  6.94 
Malawi  25.24  71.04  3.47  11.08 
Mali  26.34  58.32  167.21  33.66 
Mauritania  41.75  40.04  1.94  40.64 
Mauritius  51.12  5.71  56.17  5.82 
Morocco  30.27  4.64  281.90  8.33 
Mozambique  25.03  78.52  16.93  7.08 
Namibia  53.12  8.13  2.26  15.41 
Niger  18.40  37.82  53.16  0.16 
Nigeria  39.91  1.90  49.21  0.89 
Rwanda  6.37  77.01  49.64  9.78 
Sao Tome and Principe  10.97  55.08  6.25  0.42 
Senegal  25.90  36.74  141.71  7.95 
Seychelles  104.98  3.58  3.29  2.03 
Sierra Leone  13.01  118.01  506.76  5.36 
Somalia           89.26 
South Africa  31.34  1.55  9.43  12.82 
Sudan  17.15  18.86  71.14  60.61 
Swaziland  57.22  6.31  957.50  4.94 
Tanzania  23.48  49.32  22.11  25.16 
Togo  28.57  59.17  8.29  7.85 
Tunisia  57.37  4.44  237.50  9.60 
Uganda  19.12  64.82  117.61  15.37 
Zambia  34.97  33.10  6.32  19.95 
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